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In TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the principle that no part of the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, could
supplement the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Yet, in Brunette Machine
Works v. Kockum Industries, the Court nevertheless held that former § 1391(d),
which allowed suits against aliens in any district, applied in patent cases because aliens
simply lacked all venue defenses. But then, in 2011, Congress passed the Venue
Clarification Act, amending § 1391 to affirmatively give a venue defense to permanent
resident aliens. This entangled trifecta of venue law sources leaves open several
important questions about the current state of patent venue: Does Brunette contravene
TC Heartland? Does the Venue Clarification Act overrule Brunette? Does TC
Heartland forbid applying the Venue Clarification Act to patent suits? This Comment
reconciles these sources of law and extricates them from their current mire. Ultimately,
this Comment argues that Brunette and TC Heartland do not conflict, that Brunette
must be tweaked to accommodate the Venue Clarification Act, and that select provisions
of the Venue Clarification Act do, in fact, apply to the patent venue statute.
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INTRODUCTION
This Comment investigates some newfound problems plaguing the law of
patent venue in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC
Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands. In TC Heartland, the Court constricted
the set of districts in which domestic corporations may be sued for patent
infringement and, in doing so, reaffirmed that patent venue is governed
exclusively by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) and is not to be supplemented in any way
by the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391. The Court, moreover,
explicitly declined to address patent venue for foreign corporate defendants
or foreign defendants generally. Many courts and commentators thus assumed
that foreign defendants may still be sued in any judicial district because, as
explained by the Court in Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum Industries, alien
defendants are wholly outside the protection of the venue statutes. However,
the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011
affirmatively gave permanent resident aliens domiciled in the United States a
venue defense, thereby challenging a central pillar of Brunette’s reasoning.
This Comment explores the tensions lurking between Brunette, TC Heartland,
and the 2011 Venue Clarification Act and examines some potential resolutions
available to the Court. First, Part I describes the history of the general and patent
venue statutes, beginning with the first venue provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Part II then examines the facts, holdings, and reasonings of TC Heartland and
Brunette in detail and explicitly identifies the primary problems and inconsistencies
currently existing in the law of patent venue. Finally, Part III examines three
potential solutions—affirming, overruling, or tweaking Brunette—that the Court
could use to address these problems.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the best solution would be for the
Court to simply adjust the holding of Brunette, which currently states that all
aliens lack venue protections, to state that all nonresidents lack venue
protections. This would eliminate the possibility of venue gaps while
simultaneously respecting Congress’s clear manifestation of intent to
universally shift the focus of venue law from alienage to residence. Such a
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move, however, would amount to using § 1391(c)(1) and (c)(3), which grant
aliens venue defenses and shift the focus of venue to residence, to supplement
§ 1400(b). This seemingly contravenes TC Heartland, which held that
§ 1391(c)(2), which defines corporate residence in terms of personal
jurisdiction, does not supplement § 1400(b).
An appropriate justiﬁcation for such an analytical move is presented,
however. Since it has been historically normal for § 1391 and § 1400(b) to have
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of corporate residence, Congress’s act of amending the
deﬁnition of corporate residence in the general venue statute did not signal
an intent to work the same change in the patent venue statute. On the other
hand, because it has been historically normal for § 1391 and § 1400(b) to have
the same deﬁnition of natural-person residence and to treat alien defendants
in the same way, Congress’s act of amending § 1391(c)(1) and (c)(3) arguably
signaled a much stronger intent to work the same change in § 1400(b).
I. VENUE HISTORY
A brief review of the history of the venue statutes will help in analyzing the
current state of patent venue law.1 The first venue provision was established by
the Judiciary Act of 1789. It provided that suits “against an inhabitant of the
United States” could be brought only in judicial districts “whereof [the
defendant] is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found.”2 Because of this
language, venue protection did not extend to foreign defendants—those who
were not inhabitants of the United States.3 This section of the 1789 Act also
provided a minimum amount-in-controversy requirement and applied only to
cases in which the federal and state courts had concurrent jurisdiction.4
After nearly a century without change, Congress twice amended this
provision. First, in 1875, Congress replaced the phrase “against an inhabitant
of the United States” with “against any person.”5 Second, in 1887, Congress
1 For other accounts on venue history that briefly summarize the historical evolution of the general
and patent-specific venue statutes as well as the case law interpreting them, see Robert G. Bone, Forum
Shopping and Patent Law—A Comment on TC Heartland, 96 TEX. L. REV. 141, 149-51 (2017), and Jesse
Snyder, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands and the Big Debate About East Texas: How a
Delaware Case Leaves Patent Venue Unsettled and Presages As Applied Challenges to the Constitutionality of
Narrow Venue Interpretations, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 232, 237-39 (2017).
2 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
3 See In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 660-61 (1893) (stating that the 1789 venue provision “applied
only to inhabitants of the United States; for its words were that no civil suit should be brought
‘against an inhabitant of the United States . . . in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant, or in which he shall be found’”).
4 See § 11, 1 Stat. at 78 (stating that “the circuit courts [of the United States] shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or
in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds . . . the sum or value of five hundred dollars” (emphasis added)).
5 Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
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increased the minimum amount in controversy and removed the provision
providing proper venue where a defendant may be found.6
Although the phrase “against any person” would seem to have broadened
the applicability of the venue statute to all persons rather than just inhabitants
of the United States, the Supreme Court in In re Hohorst declared the change
to be stylistic only.7 To support this position, the Court stressed that any other
interpretation would immunize foreign defendants from suit since aliens, by
deﬁnition, do not inhabit any judicial district.8 Thus, the Court held that
foreign defendants—both natural persons and corporations—still lacked
venue protections and could therefore be sued anywhere.9
The Hohorst opinion, however, further supported its ruling by noting the
inconsistency of applying the general venue statute to patent cases.10 Since the
general venue statute had a minimum amount-in-controversy requirement and
applied only to cases where state courts had concurrent jurisdiction, it could
not reach patent suits, the Court implied, since patent cases required no
minimum amount in controversy and were exclusively under federal
jurisdiction.11 This caused great confusion among the lower courts as to
whether the venue laws applied to patent suits at all.12
In response to this rampant confusion, Congress enacted the Patent
Statute of 1897, which provided that patent suits could be brought “in the
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552.
See Hohorst, 150 U.S. at 661 (“The substitution . . . of the words ‘against any person’ for the
words ‘against an inhabitant of the United States,’ has been assumed to be an immaterial change.”).
8 See id. at 660 (“To construe the [general venue] provision as applicable to all suits between a
citizen and an alien would leave the courts of the United States open to aliens against citizens, and
close them to citizens against aliens. Such a construction . . . would be inconsistent with the general
intent of the section . . . .”). Because the 1887 Act removed the provision providing proper venue
where a defendant may be found, venue was proper only in the district where the defendant was an
inhabitant. However, foreign defendants were considered inhabitants of no district. See Brunette
Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 709 (1972) (“[T]he general venue
provisions were framed with reference to the defendant’s place of residence or citizenship, and an
alien defendant is by deﬁnition a citizen of no district.”).
9 See Hohorst, 150 U.S. at 662 (holding that the general venue statutes were “inapplicable to an
alien or a foreign corporation . . . [and] consequently, such a person or corporation [could] be sued
by a citizen of a State of the Union in any district”).
10 See id. at 661-62 (“If the [venue] clause . . . defining the district in which suit shall be brought is
applicable to patent cases, the clause limiting the jurisdiction to matters of a certain amount . . . must be
. . . equally applicable, with the result that no court . . . would have jurisdiction of patent suits involving
a less amount . . . .”); see also Brunette, 406 U.S. at 712 (“[T]he venue restrictions, said the [Hohorst] Court,
were intended to apply only to that part of the federal jurisdiction that was concurrent with state court
jurisdiction, and not to patent suits, which are entrusted exclusively to the federal courts.”).
11 Hohorst, 150 U.S. at 662.
12 Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 564 (1942) (“After the holding of In re
Hohorst . . . the lower federal courts became uncertain as to the applicability of the [general venue
statute] to patent infringement proceedings.”); see also Brunette, 406 U.S. at 712 (“After Hohorst, there
was great confusion on this point in the lower courts.”).
6
7
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district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which
the defendant . . . shall have committed acts of infringement and have a
regular and established place of business.”13 In Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin
Lloyd Co., the Court recognized that Congress enacted this law to eliminate
lower court confusion by “deﬁn[ing] the exact jurisdiction of the federal
courts in actions to enforce patent rights.”14 So, the Court held that the patent
venue statute was the exclusive venue provision for patent suits, “not
intend[ed] . . . to dovetail with the general [venue] provisions.”15
In 1948, Congress recodiﬁed the venue statutes. The new patent venue
law, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), provided that venue was proper “where the
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”16 Thus, the
focus shifted from inhabitance to residence. The new general venue law, 28
U.S.C. § 1391, stated that “[a]n alien [could] be sued in any district”17 and
expanded the deﬁnition of corporate residence, previously only the state of
incorporation,18 to “any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed
to do business or is doing business.”19
Despite these amendments, the Court in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Products Corp. held that venue in patent cases had not been substantively
changed.20 First, the Court noted that, because “inhabitant” and “resident” are
“synonymous words [that] mean domicile,” the codification of § 1400(b) did not
substantively affect patent venue.21 Second, because § 1400(b) is the “sole and
exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and . . . is
not to be supplemented by the provisions of . . . § 1391(c),” the expanded
definition of corporate residence in the general venue statute did not apply in
patent cases.22 Thus, for patent purposes, corporations were deemed to reside
only in their state of incorporation, notwithstanding § 1391(c).
By the 1970s, the Supreme Court had twice ruled, in Stonite and Fourco, that
the patent venue statute alone controlled venue in patent cases. However,

Patent Statute of 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, 695.
315 U.S. at 565.
Id. at 565-66; see also id. at 565 n.5 (“The [patent venue statute] is intended to remove this
uncertainty and to deﬁne the exact jurisdiction of the circuit courts in [patent] matters.” (quoting
29 CONG. REC. 1900 (1897)).
16 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1400(b), 62 Stat. 935, 936 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012)).
17 § 1391(d), 62 Stat. at 935.
18 In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893) (“[A] corporation cannot be considered a citizen, an
inhabitant or a resident of a State in which it has not been incorporated . . . .”).
19 § 1391(c), 62 Stat. at 935.
20 See 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957) (“[W]e hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) . . . made no substantive
change [to the law of patent venue] as it stood and was dealt with in the Stonite case.”).
21 Id. at 226.
22 Id. at 229.
13
14
15
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§ 1400(b) had no provision regarding venue for foreign defendants.23 To
eliminate potential venue gaps, the Court in Brunette, while reaffirming that
§ 1400(b) stood alone, simultaneously invoked the underlying principle of
§ 1391(d), which allowed aliens to be sued in any district, to hold that foreign
defendants were “wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws,
general and special.”24 Thus, § 1400(b) was still the exclusive venue provision for
patent cases; it just did not apply to foreign defendants because no venue law did.
In 1988, Congress again changed the deﬁnition of corporate residence
under the general venue statutes, providing that “[f]or purposes of venue
under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside
in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction.”25
Because § 1400(b) and § 1391 were in the same statutory chapter, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in VE Holding v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.
determined that Congress had signaled an intent to change the deﬁnition of
corporate residence in patent cases as well.26 Thus, corporations were deemed
to reside wherever they were subject to personal jurisdiction, whether or not
the suit was for patent infringement.
In 2011, Congress most recently amended the general venue statutes via
the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clariﬁcation Act. This Act added
a saving clause—“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law”—to § 1391, gave a
venue defense to lawfully admitted, permanent resident aliens residing in the
United States, and provided that “a defendant not resident in the United
States may be sued in any judicial district.”27 The Act also eliminated the
language “under this chapter” that was heavily relied upon in VE Holding.
Finally, in TC Heartland, the Court overruled VE Holding, deciding that
the 1988 and 2011 general venue amendments had not signaled a congressional
intent to change the law of patent venue, and again reaﬃrmed that § 1400(b)
is the sole and exclusive venue provision for patent suits, not to be
supplemented in any way by § 1391.28 Thus, for patent purposes, domestic
corporations again reside only in their state of incorporation,
notwithstanding the contrary deﬁnition of corporate residence in the general

See § 1400(b), 62 Stat. at 936.
Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972).
Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (codiﬁed as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012)).
26 See 917 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he language of the statute is clear and its meaning
is unambiguous . . . . Section 1391(c) applies to all of chapter 87 of title 28, and thus to § 1400(b), as
expressed by the words ‘For purposes of venue under this chapter.’ There can be no mistake about that.”).
27 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clariﬁcation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, sec. 202,
§ 1391(a), (c)(1), 125 Stat. 758, 763.
28 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017).
23
24
25
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venue statute.29 The Court, however, made sure to note that it had not
expressed any opinion regarding proper venue for foreign corporations.30
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT TC HEARTLAND AND BRUNETTE
Now that the history of the venue statutes has been reviewed, this Part
examines more thoroughly the details of the TC Heartland and Brunette
opinions and explores potential problems and inconsistencies in the law of
patent venue that may become the subject of future litigation.
A. TC Heartland: § 1400(b) Still Stands Alone
The facts in TC Heartland are straightforward. Kraft, the plaintiﬀ,
competed with TC Heartland in the ﬂavored drink-mix market.31 Due to
suspected patent infringement, Kraft, a limited liability company organized
under the laws of Delaware, sued TC Heartland, a limited liability company
organized under the laws of Indiana.32 TC Heartland, arguing that it neither
resided nor had a regular and established place of business in the District of
Delaware, moved to transfer the case to the Southern District of Indiana.33
Interestingly, Kraft alleged, and TC Heartland admitted, that TC
Heartland was a corporation rather than a limited liability company.34 In fact,
TC Heartland explicitly cited Fourco to support its argument that it did not
reside in Delaware because it was not incorporated there.35 Thus, a case that
should have concerned the deﬁnition of residence for limited liability
companies instead focused on corporate residence.
Relying on VE Holding, which held that the expanded deﬁnition of
corporate residence in § 1391 applied to § 1400(b), both the district court and
the Federal Circuit sided with Kraft in denying the motion to transfer.36
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court ultimately found that “the [1988
and 2011] amendments to § 1391 did not modify the meaning of § 1400(b) as
interpreted by Fourco.”37 Thus, the Court overruled VE Holding and reaﬃrmed
Fourco by concluding that “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State
of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.”38 In doing so, the
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id.
Id. at 1520 n.2.
Id. at 1517.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1517 n.1.
Id. at 1517.
Id.
Id.
Id.

1030

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 1023

Court again held that § 1400(b) stands alone and is not to be supplemented
by any other venue statute.
Now, an in-depth examination of the Court’s reasoning is paramount. To
support its decision, the Court ﬁrst noted that the argument put forth by
Kraft—that “§ 1400(b) incorporates the broader deﬁnition of corporate
‘residence’ contained in the general venue statute”—was identical to the
argument considered and rejected in Fourco.39 So, the Court framed the
question as whether the law of patent venue had been substantively changed
since the decision in Fourco.
Next, the Court recounted the historical evolution of the general and patent
venue provisions, just as explained above in Part I.40 Here, the Court
highlighted that, as decided in Fourco and Stonite, Congress’s enactment of the
patent venue statute had “placed patent infringement cases in a class by
themselves, outside the scope of the general venue legislation”; that Congress
did not intend patent venue “to dovetail with the general provisions relating to
the venue of civil suits”; and that “the patent venue statute ‘alone should control
venue in patent infringement proceedings.’”41 Furthermore, the Court
specifically emphasized that, while the general venue statute had been amended
twice since Fourco, the patent venue statute had not been directly amended at
all.42 Thus, any change in the meaning of the patent venue statute could be
implied, if at all, only from direct changes in the general venue statute.
Now on the search for an implicit amendment, the Court proclaimed that,
“[w]hen Congress intends to [indirectly amend one statute by directly
amending another], it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its
intent in the text of the amended provision.”43 Thus, the Court would
apparently not hold that the meaning of § 1400(b) was supplemented by
§ 1391 unless the very text of § 1391 clearly indicated so. Unfortunately for
Kraft, and for patent plaintiﬀs generally, the Court ultimately concluded that
the text of § 1391 manifested no such intent.44
The Court proﬀered three textualist arguments for this ﬁnding of no
congressional intent. First, it noted that, “[a]lthough the current version of
§ 1391(c) provides a default rule that applies ‘[f]or all venue purposes,’ the
version at issue in Fourco similarly provided a default rule that applied ‘for
Id. at 1516-17.
See id. at 1518-20 (noting that “[t]he history of the relevant statutes provides important
context for the issue in this case”).
41 Id. at 1518.
42 See id. at 1517 (“Congress has not amended § 1400(b) since this Court construed it in Fourco . . . .”);
id. at 1520 (“Congress adopted the current version of § 1391 in 2011 (again leaving § 1400(b) unaltered).”
(emphasis added)).
43 Id. at 1520.
44 See id. (“The current version of § 1391 does not contain any indication that Congress
intended to alter the meaning of § 1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco.”).
39
40
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venue purposes.’”45 Because both phrases—“for all venue purposes” and “for
venue purposes”—had previously been construed to comprehensively mean
“all venue statutes,”46 the Court did “not see any material diﬀerence between
the two phrasings,” thereby strengthening the analogy to Fourco.47
Second, the Court strongly emphasized the presence of the phrase “except as
otherwise provided by law” in § 1391(a), which it termed a “saving clause.”48 The
Court explained that the holding of Fourco and the argument of TC Heartland
were even stronger under the current version of § 1391 since the statute itself now
includes “a saving clause expressly stating that it does not apply when ‘otherwise
provided by law.’”49 That is, “Fourco’s holding rests on even firmer footing now
that § 1391’s saving clause expressly contemplates that certain venue statutes may
retain definitions of ‘resides’ that conflict with its default definition.”50
Lastly, the Court explained that, if Congress manifested any intent in the
2011 Venue Clarification Act, it was to legislatively overrule VE Holding.51
Specifically, the Court noted that, “[i]f anything, the 2011 amendments
undermine [VE Holding’s] rationale” because “Congress deleted ‘under this
chapter’ in 2011 and worded the current version of § 1391(c) almost identically
to the original version of the statute.”52
Importantly, the Court declined to consider the implications of its
decision on venue for foreign corporations and expressly chose to not
reconsider its holding in Brunette.53
The TC Heartland opinion has received some pointed criticism from at
least one scholar.54 Professor Bone, law professor at the University of Texas
at Austin, argues that the Court completely ignored the real-world
consequences of the decision (for example, drastically diminishing case
concentration in the Eastern District of Texas) and describes the opinion as
“surprisingly formalistic,” “remarkably thin,” and “unpersuasive . . . on its
own terms.”55 Professor Bone further asserts that “[i]f the venue statutes were
Id.
See id. (citing Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 204-05 (1966)).
Id.; see also id. at 1521 (“[T]he addition of the word ‘all’ to the already comprehensive
provision does not suggest that Congress intended for [the Court] to reconsider [Fourco].”).
48 Id. at 1521.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See id. (“[T]here is no indication that Congress in 2011 ratiﬁed the Federal Circuit’s decision
in VE Holding.”).
52 Id.
53 See id. at 1520 n.2 (“The parties dispute the implications of petitioner’s argument for foreign
corporations. We do not here address that question, nor do we express any opinion on this Court’s
holding in Brunette . . . (determining proper venue for foreign corporation under then existing
statutory regime).” (citation omitted)).
54 See generally Bone, supra note 1.
55 Id. at 148.
45
46
47
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the same today as in 1948, the TC Heartland Court would be justiﬁed in
following Fourco . . . . But they are not [the same].”56
Professor Bone supports his criticisms with three arguments. First, he
argues that the Court’s search for a congressional intent to implicitly amend
§ 1400(b) misses the mark because making a term in a statutory provision
subject to a deﬁnition appearing elsewhere in the same statute is not
equivalent to amending the provision itself.57
Second, Professor Bone notes that “Congress converted § 1391(c) from a
substantive venue provision [containing] a definition into a purely definitional
section,” thereby “further support[ing] the conclusion that Congress meant the
§ 1391(c) definition to apply [throughout all the venue statutes].”58
Third, Professor Bone argues that the Court’s emphasis on Congress not
manifesting an intent to ratify VE Holding or to overrule Fourco also misses the
mark.59 He explains that, since “VE Holding had been the law for more than two
decades,” “Congress might reasonably have assumed that VE Holding defined
the legal baseline,” meaning that “there would have been no reason for Congress
to say anything at all about Fourco Glass in 2011 or [to] signal any intent to
change the meaning of § 1400(b).”60 Professor Bone extends this criticism to
the Court’s reliance on the saving clause. He asserts that the Court’s argument
“works only if Congress in 2011 assumed that Fourco Glass still defined corporate
residence for purposes of § 1400(b). But it is at least equally plausible that
Congress assumed VE Holding, not Fourco Glass, [controlled] . . . .”61
An additional criticism that can be leveled against TC Heartland is that it
seems to ignore Congress’s intent as manifested in the House Report
accompanying the 2011 Venue Clarification Act. As explained above, TC
Heartland reaffirmed Fourco and Stonite in holding that § 1400(b) stands alone
and is not to be supplemented by § 1391.62 Admittedly, Congress recognized
that § 1391 overall would not nullify the more than two hundred special venue
provisions that exist throughout the United States Code.63 However, Congress
Id. at 149.
See id. at 151 (“[T]he question [at issue] is not whether an amendment to one provision—
§ 1391(c)—implicitly amends a diﬀerent provision—§ 1400(b). [Rather, t]he question is whether a
particular term (‘resides’) is subject to a deﬁnition appearing elsewhere in the same statute.”).
58 Id. at 151 n.67.
59 See id. at 152.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 153.
62 See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518-20 (2017) (“[In
Fourco, t]his Court squarely rejected that interpretation, reaffirming Stonite’s holding that § 1400(b) ‘is
the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and . . . is not to be
supplemented by . . . § 1391(c).’”).
63 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 18 (2011) (“New paragraph 1391(a)(1) would follow current law
in providing the general requirement for venue choices, but would not displace the special venue
rules that govern under particular Federal statutes.”); id. at 18 n.8 (“These specialized [venue]
56
57
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also explicitly noted that § 1391(c), which provides the definition of corporate
residence, would nevertheless apply universally.64 Thus, it seems that the
Court utterly ignored this clear indication that § 1400(b), along with all other
venue provisions in the United States Code, was intended to be substantively
affected by the 2011 Venue Clarification Act. Regardless, TC Heartland (at least
for the purposes of this Comment) is good law for the time being.
B. Brunette: Suits Against Aliens Are Beyond All Venue Protections
Now, we turn to the details of Brunette. Kockum Industries, an Alabama
corporation, patented a bark-removing machine.65 Suspecting that Brunette
Machine Works, a Canadian corporation, was helping others to make and use
the invention, Kockum sued for indirect patent infringement in the District of
Oregon.66 Brunette, relying on Fourco and Stonite, argued that § 1400(b) was the
only venue provision applicable to patent suits.67 Since it was not incorporated
in Oregon and lacked a regular and established place of business there, Brunette
asserted that venue was improper.68 Although the district court accepted this
argument and dismissed the case, the circuit court reversed, holding that
§ 1391(d), which at the time allowed suits against aliens in any judicial district,
applied to all suits, including those for patent infringement.69
Ultimately, the Supreme Court aﬃrmed the circuit court and held that
“suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue
laws, general and special.”70
Again, analyzing the Court’s reasoning is paramount. Just as in TC
Heartland, the Court began by reviewing the history of the venue statutes.71
It ﬁrst considered the Judiciary Act of 1789 and noted that, “[b]ecause [the
1789 Act’s] limitation on the place where federal cases might be tried applied
in terms only to suits against ‘an inhabitant of the United States,’ suits against
aliens were left unrestricted, and could be tried in any district.”72 The Court
statutes would continue to govern within their respective ﬁelds, and the general venue statute would
govern diversity and Federal question litigation outside these special areas.”).
64 See id. at 20 (“[The] proposed subsection 1391(c) would apply to all venuestatutes [sic], including
venue provisions that appear elsewhere in the United States Code. It deﬁnes residence for natural persons,
incorporated and unincorporated entities, and also provides a rule for nonresident defendants. This
would replace current subsection 1391(c), which applies . . . only for purposes of venue under
Chapter 87.” (emphasis added)).
65 Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 707 (1972).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 714.
71 Id. at 708-11.
72 Id. at 708.
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then reaﬃrmed Hohorst by recognizing that the 1875 Act’s replacement of the
phrase “against an inhabitant of the United States” with “against any person”
was “stylistic and not substantive, and that Congress did not thereby bring
suits against aliens within the scope of the venue laws.”73
Next, the Court reiterated Hohorst’s rationale regarding immunizing
foreign defendants from suit.74 Speciﬁcally, the Court noted that
to hold the venue statutes applicable to suits against aliens would be in eﬀect
to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction in most cases, because the general
venue provisions were framed with reference to the defendant’s place of
residence or citizenship, and an alien defendant is by deﬁnition a citizen of
no district.75

The Court further buttressed this rationale by discussing the general
desirability of construing statutes to avoid venue gaps.76
Additionally, the Court strongly emphasized that the reasoning of Hohorst
still applied since Congress had never signaled otherwise.77 Speciﬁcally, the
Court noted that “Congress ha[d] never given the slightest indication that it
[was] dissatisﬁed with the longstanding judicial view that the 1789 language
continue[d] to color the venue statutes, with the result that suits against aliens
[were] outside the scope of all the venue laws.”78
The Court then turned its discussion to Congress’s enactment of the patent
venue statute.79 It noted that, “[a]fter Hohorst, there was great confusion . . . in
the lower courts” and that “Congress responded promptly [by] creating a
special new venue statute for the occasion.”80 The Court recognized that, as
held in Stonite and Fourco, this special statute “placed patent infringement cases
in a class by themselves, outside the scope of general venue legislation.”81 In
other words, the Court paid homage to the principle that § 1400(b) was the sole
and exclusive venue provision governing patent suits and was not to be
supplemented in any way by the general provisions of § 1391.

Id. at 709.
Id.
Id.; see also id. at 710 (“[I]t should not lightly be assumed that Congress intended that result,
in light of the fact that the venue provisions are designed, not to keep suits out of the federal courts,
but merely to allocate suits to the most appropriate or convenient federal forum.”).
76 See id. at 710 n.8 (“Congress does not in general intend to create venue gaps, which take
away with one hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other. Thus, in
construing venue statutes it is reasonable to prefer the construction that avoids leaving such a gap.”).
77 Id. at 710.
78 Id. at 710-11.
79 Id. at 712-13.
80 Id. at 712.
81 Id. at 713.
73
74
75
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Nevertheless, the Court stated that the fact that § 1400(b) stands alone
“sheds no light on the present case”82 and ultimately held that aliens can be
sued in any judicial district, as provided by then-existing § 1391(d).83 The Court
justified this holding, which was seemingly inconsistent with Stonite, Fourco,
and the first half of the Brunette opinion itself, by explaining that “it totally
misconceives the origin and purpose of § 1391(d) to characterize that statute as
an appendage to the general venue statutes” that “§ 1400(b) was intended to
replace.”84 Rather, it “reflects . . . the longstanding rule that suits against alien
defendants are outside those [venue] statutes.”85 Thus, “[s]ince the general
venue statutes did not reach suits against alien defendants, there is no reason
to suppose the new substitute in patent cases was intended to do so.”86
The Court concluded its opinion by proclaiming that “[t]he principle
[expressed in] § 1391(d) cannot be conﬁned in its application to cases that
would otherwise fall under the general venue statutes [because] § 1391(d) is
properly regarded, not as a venue restriction at all.”87 Instead, it is “a
declaration of the long-established rule that suits against aliens are wholly
outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special.”88
Currently, many courts and commentators believe that, because it was not
expressly overruled by TC Heartland, Brunette remains good law, meaning that
foreign corporations, and foreign defendants in general, can be sued in any
judicial district, even in patent suits.89 Others, however, argue that TC Heartland
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 713.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id.
See Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Kyocera Corp., No. 17-0087, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207204, at
*7 n.5 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017) (“While TC Heartland declared that venue for a domestic corporation
is governed solely and exclusively by § 1400(b), the Supreme Court made clear that this holding did
not address the applicability of § 1400(b) to foreign defendants, explicitly stating that it was not
‘express[ing] any opinion on’ its holding in Brunette. Hence, Brunette remains good law.” (emphasis
added) (citations omitted)); see also 3G Licensing, S.A. v. HTC Corp., No. 17-0083, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 207202, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 18, 2017) (“Brunette remains good law . . . .”); Michael C. Smith,
2017 Year in Review: Patent Litigation, 81 TEX. B.J. 39, 40 (2018) (“The [C]ourt did not express any
opinion on the implications of the decision on foreign corporations, thus for the moment, leaving the
law with respect to venue against foreign corporations . . . untouched.”); Fish & Richardson,
Unanswered Questions After TC Heartland, JD SUPRA (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/unanswered-questions-after-tc-heartland-88546 [https://perma.cc/AR5H-AP8R] (“Foreign
corporations that do not reside in the United States likely remain subject to suit under § 1391(c)(3)
in any judicial district, as they always have been.”); S. Gregory Herrman, Observations in the Wake of
Narrowing of Patent Venue in ‘TC Heartland’, DEL. BUS. COURT INSIDER (June 7, 2017),
https://www.blankrome.com/publications/observations-wake-narrowing-patent-venue-tc-heartland
[https://perma.cc/AM6Z-G6WV] (“It seems unlikely, however, that the TC Heartland decision will have any
significant impact on venue for foreign defendants.”); Diane Lettelleir, The Real Impact of TC Heartland on the
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
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purposely refrained from reaffirming Brunette, which may indicate that the
Court’s rationale might have unforeseen consequences for foreign defendants.90
C. The Problem: Brunette Butts Heads with TC Heartland and Seemingly
Contradicts the Venue Clarification Act
With the details of both Brunette and TC Heartland in mind, as well as the
history of the venue statutes, two potential problems become apparent. First, TC
Heartland and Brunette seem to contradict each other regarding whether § 1400(b)
truly is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent suits. Second,
Brunette’s rationale, in light of the 2011 Venue Clarification Act, is now in question.
1. Under Brunette and TC Heartland, Does § 1400(b) Really Stand Alone?
At this point in time, the Supreme Court has thrice ruled in unambiguous
terms that the special patent venue statute, § 1400(b), is the sole and exclusive
provision governing venue in patent suits and that it is not to be
supplemented in any way by the general venue provision, § 1391.91 TC
Heartland reinforced this wall of separation between § 1391 and § 1400(b) by
holding that the deﬁnition of corporate residence found in the former—and
which, by its own terms, applies “for all venue purposes”—does not deﬁne
corporate residence for the purposes of the latter.92 However, Brunette seemingly
contradicts this clear rule because, in that case, the Court appeared to apply a
EDTX Venue, LOT NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/the-real-impact-of-tc-heartland-on-the-edtx-venue
[https://perma.cc/W36L-P73R] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018) (“TC Heartland ha[d] no impact on foreign
companies.”); Amy M. Pepke, Patent Venue After TC Heartland: Where Do We Go from Here?, BUTLER SNOW:
THE IP UPDATE (May 23, 2017), https://www.butlersnow.com/2017/05/patent-venue-tc-heartland-go
[https://perma.cc/7ZF3-J8ZJ] (“While not discussed in the opinion, venue in patent infringement
actions involving ‘foreign corporations’ are still subject to § 1391 by virtue of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brunette . . . .”).
90 See Memorandum from Simpson Thacher & Barlett LLP, Supreme Court Clamps Down on
Venue Shopping in Patent Cases 1 (May 23, 2017), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/
memos/ﬁrmmemo_05_23_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPU2-GW4A] (“The eﬀect of TC Heartland on
foreign corporate defendants is unclear.” (emphasis added)); Matt Blackburn, Patent Venue—Foreign
Corporations vs. Domestic Corporations, LINKEDIN (July 25, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/
patent-venue-foreign-corporations-vs-domestic-matt-blackburn [https://perma.cc/7YS8-XNFE] (“Because
the Court in TC Heartland expressly avoided endorsing the holding in Brunette, foreign corporate defendants
may look to challenge nationwide venue . . . .”); Crowell & Moring LLP, “Residence” for Patent Venue
Refers Only to a Defendant’s State of Incorporation, LEXOLOGY (May 25, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=dc73d3d9-f112-4006-a283-b3b73f27d580 [https://perma.cc/3CEK-XTT3] (“[T]he
Supreme Court left open the question of how TC Heartland applies to foreign corporations . . . .”); Full
Significance of TC Heartland Lies in Nuances of Court’s Decision, RPX CORP.: INTELLIGENCE BLOG
(May 25, 2017), https://www.rpxcorp.com/intelligence/blog/full-signiﬁcance-of-tc-heartland-lies-innuances-of-courts-decision [https://perma.cc/R7XQ-4JXH] (“The ruling explicitly declines to
address venue for foreign corporations.”).
91 See supra Part I.
92 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017).
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portion of the general venue statute—§ 1391(d) at the time—to the patent venue
statute.93 In fact, Brunette has been explicitly understood by many, including the
Federal Circuit in VE Holding, as directly supplementing § 1400(b) with § 1391.94
Thus, from one side of its mouth, the Supreme Court proclaims that patent suits
are in a class by themselves, governed solely and exclusively by § 1400(b) with
absolutely no consideration for the provisions of § 1391; but, from the other side,
it appears to state that one provision of § 1391 nevertheless applies to patent suits
anyway. This is the inconsistency that worries patent practitioners.95
However, even though TC Heartland and Brunette seem contradictory on their
faces, the inconsistency disappears upon closer review. When the wording and
rationale of Brunette are more carefully scrutinized, it becomes clear that the Court
did not actually supplement § 1400(b) with § 1391(d). Rather, the Court explained
that § 1391(d) is simply “a declaration of the long-established rule that suits against
aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and
93 See Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972) (holding that
foreign defendants in patent suits can be sued in any judicial district, as provided by then-existing § 1391(d)).
94 See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“The Court [in Brunette] held § 1391(d) applied, and that § 1400(b) was supplemented by the
provision governing suits against aliens.”); see also Brief for Respondent at 12-13, TC Heartland LLC
v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341) (“In Brunette, this Court held
that former Section 1391(d), which prevented alien defendants from raising venue objections, applied
to patent-infringement actions governed by Section 1400(b).”).
95 See Matthew Bultman, Foreign Cos. Expected to Test Venue Rules After TC Heartland, LAW360
(June 5, 2017, 8:50 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/931373/foreign-cos-expected-to-testvenue-rules-after-tc-heartland [https://perma.cc/6BCY-PLJ2] (“With TC Heartland and other
decisions, the Supreme Court has in effect said the special patent venue statute—Section 1400(b)—is
the ‘be all and end all’ for patent venue . . . . Some might then question why courts are looking to another
section when it comes to foreign defendants.” (emphasis added)); Rachel K. Hunnicutt & Alexander B.
Owczarczak, Patent Venue After TC Heartland, WILEY REIN LLP (May 23, 2017),
https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-articles-Implications_of_TC_Heartland.html [https://perma.cc/
ZS65-82WY] (“The repeated, clear statements that § 1400(b) alone dictates patent venue
determinations appears [sic] to be in tension with Brunette . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Brief of
Amici Curiae Eighteen Individuals & Organizations Representing Inventors & Patent Owners in
Support of Respondent at 10 n.2, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct.
1514 (2017) (No. 16-341) (“Petitioner argues that [the deﬁnition of corporate residence under] Section
1391(c) cannot supplement or deﬁne any aspect of venue for Section 1400, but then concedes the
opposite—that Section 1391(c) must supplement Section 1400 for foreign defendants.”); Brief of
Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Ass’n in Support of Neither Party at 9, TC
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341) (“Although
Petitioner argues that section 1400(b) is now the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in
patent infringement actions, it does not explain why subsection 1391(c)(2), the general corporate
venue statute, does not apply to section 1400(b), but section 1391(c)(3), the general non-U.S. resident
venue statute, does.”); Joseph Re & Perry Oldham, TC Heartland Complicates Venue for Foreign
Defendants, LAW360 (June 29, 2017, 12:34 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/935949/
tc-heartland-complicates-venue-for-foreign-defendants [https://perma.cc/A7J9-JH46] (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s [TC Heartland] ruling that the more restrictive patent venue statute (§ 1400(b)) should stand on
its own is in tension with the long-standing rule in the general venue statute (§ 1391) that venue over
foreign defendants can be in any judicial district.”).
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special.”96 In other words, before the codification of § 1391, the rule that alien
defendants could not raise venue defenses was not written in a statute but was
understood by the courts and Congress nonetheless.97 This implicit rule was the
backdrop against which Congress enacted the special patent venue statute; since all
venue laws at that time had excluded aliens, argued the Court, certainly Congress
intended the newly enacted patent venue statute to likewise exclude aliens.98
The Court further explained that “[t]he principle of § 1391(d) cannot be
confined in its application to cases that would otherwise fall under the general
venue statutes.”99 That is, § 1391(d) simply memorialized a far-reaching
principle—that aliens have no venue defenses—and that principle’s wide-ranging
application could not be retroactively cabined just because the principle had been
recognized in a more limited statute.
Thus, the Court in Brunette did not supplement § 1400(b) with § 1391(d).
Instead, the Court recognized that § 1400(b) was enacted with an implicit
exception—that it would not encompass foreign defendants—and this
implicit exception would have applied even if the exception had not been
written down in § 1391.100
2. Does Brunette’s Rationale Still Apply?
Although Brunette’s holding can actually be squared with TC Heartland,
Brunette’s reasoning may no longer be accurate. Recall that Brunette proffered
two main reasons for holding that aliens could not raise venue defenses, even
in patent suits. First, the Court was wary of immunizing foreign defendants
from suit, as was the Hohorst Court.101 Thus, the Court preferred to construe

Brunette, 406 U.S. at 714 (emphasis added).
See In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893) (holding that foreign defendants “may be sued
by a citizen of a State of the Union in any district”).
98 See Brunette, 406 U.S. at 713 (“Since the general venue statutes did not reach suits against alien
defendants, there is no reason to suppose the new substitute in patent cases was intended to do so.”).
99 Id. at 714.
100 See In re Princeton Dig. Image Corp., 496 F. App’x 73, 75 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“By confirming
that the general patent venue limitations of section 1400(b) were inapplicable in suits against foreign
defendants, Brunette did not hold . . . that the Court was departing from its prior decisions . . . . Instead,
Brunette merely reaffirmed the principle that foreign defendants should not be able to avoid suit in the
United States based on a lack of residence or citizenship in this country.”).
101 See Brunette, 406 U.S. at 709 (“[T]o hold the venue statutes applicable to suits against aliens
would be in eﬀect to oust the federal courts of jurisdiction in most cases, because the general venue
provisions were framed with reference to the defendant’s place of residence or citizenship, and an
alien defendant is by deﬁnition a citizen of no district.”); In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. at 660 (“To construe
the provision as applicable to all suits between a citizen and an alien would leave the courts of the
United States open to aliens against citizens, and close them to citizens against aliens.”).
96
97
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the venue statutes to avoid such immunization.102 Second, the Court
emphasized that, in all the time since Hohorst, “Congress ha[d] never given the
slightest indication that it [was] dissatisfied with the longstanding judicial view
that the 1789 language continues to color the venue statutes, with the result that
suits against aliens are outside the scope of all the venue laws.”103 But as
explained below, the 2011 Venue Clarification Act manifested much more than
“the slightest indication” that Congress intended at least some aliens to have a
venue defense, thereby significantly undermining this justification in Brunette.
The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clariﬁcation Act of 2011
signiﬁcantly amended, among other things, the general venue provisions of
§ 1391. First, it added the disclaimer “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law”
to § 1391(a).104 As explained in the accompanying House Report, this saving
clause indicated that the new § 1391 “would follow current law in providing
the general requirements for venue choices, but would not displace the special
venue rules that govern under particular Federal statutes.”105
Second, the Act changed the phrase “[f]or purposes of venue under this
chapter” to “[f]or all venue purposes.”106 According to the House Report, this
phrase signiﬁed that “subsection 1391(c) would apply to all venuestatutes [sic],
including venue provisions that appear elsewhere in the United States Code,”
notwithstanding the disclaimer in § 1391(a).107
Third, the Act provided that “a natural person, including an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to
reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.”108 The Act
also amended the prior version of § 1391(d), which provided that “an alien
may be sued in any district,” to now read “a defendant not resident in the
United States may be sued in any judicial district.”109 According to the House
Report, the “proposed paragraph of 1391(c)(3) would change venue law by
shifting the focus from ‘alienage’ of a defendant to whether the defendant has

102 See Brunette, 406 U.S. at 710 n.8 (“Congress does not in general intend to create venue gaps, which
take away with one hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the other. Thus, in
construing venue statutes it is reasonable to prefer the construction that avoids leaving such a gap.”).
103 Id. at 710-11 (emphasis added).
104 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clariﬁcation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, sec.
202, § 1391(a), 125 Stat. 758, 763.
105 H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 18 (2011); see also id. at 18 n.8 (“These specialized statutes would
continue to govern within their respective fields, and the general venue statute would govern . . . outside
these special areas.”).
106 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act sec. 202, § 1391(c), 125 Stat. at 763.
107 H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 20; see also id. (“[Section 1391(c)] defines residency for natural persons,
incorporated and unincorporated entities, and also provides a rule for nonresident defendants. This would
replace current subsection 1391(c), which applies . . . only for purposes of venue under Chapter 87.”).
108 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act sec. 202, § 1391(c)(1), 125 Stat. at 763.
109 Id. § 1391(c)(3), 125 Stat. at 763.
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his or her ‘residence’ outside the United States.”110 The report further
explained that “[t]he proposed statute would grant a venue defense to
permanent resident aliens who are domiciled in the United States.”111
So, Brunette heavily relied on the fact that Congress had not made “the slightest
indication” that aliens were to have venue defenses. Yet, in light of the 2011 Venue
Clarification Act and accompanying House Report, Congress explicitly recognized
that it was changing venue law by affirmatively giving a venue defense to at least a
subset of aliens. The tension here is self-evident.112 Accomplished practitioners
Joseph Re and Perry Oldham explained the problem well:
Brunette’s rationale no longer seems to apply. No longer can one say that the
venue statute merely recognizes the long-established rule that suits against
foreign defendants are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue
laws, general and special. No longer is it accurate that all foreign defendants
do not have a venue defense. When it amended § 1391, Congress created a
venue defense for at least some foreign defendants. As a result, litigants will
surely argue that Brunette is no longer good law . . . .113

III. POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS
Now that the details of the relevant cases and statutes have been explored
and the primary problem with Brunette has been uncovered, this Part
examines some potential resolutions available to the Court. As explained
below, these include reaﬃrming, overruling, or adjusting Brunette. Although
legislative solutions are possible, they are beyond the scope of this Comment.

H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 22.
Id. at 23; see also Mark W. McInerney & Thaddeus E. Morgan, The Federal Courts Jurisdiction
and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, MICH. B.J., May 2012, at 20, 22 (“Previously, permanent resident
aliens domiciled in the U.S. were treated the same as nonresident aliens for purposes of being barred
from raising a venue defense.”).
112 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 94, at 24-25 (“[T]he Venue Clarification Act
substantially revised Section 1391(d). . . . [I]ts focus is now on residence rather than on citizenship: it
now provides a venue defense for lawful permanent residents and foreign corporations doing business
in the United States . . . .”); Re & Oldham, supra note 95 (“An examination of [the Venue Clarification
Act] amendments, and the legislative intent behind them, casts doubt on Brunette’s reasoning that
foreign defendants are outside of the venue rules.” (emphasis added)); see also Bultman, supra note 95
(“Another potential battleground could be whether the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brunette remains
good law.”); Shearman & Sterling LLP, More Trouble Brewing in the Heartland: Foreign Corporation
Immunity and Other Issues Arising from the Supreme Court’s Venue Decision, MONDAQ,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/606728/Patent/More+Trouble+Brewing+in+the+Heartland+
Foreign+Corporation+Immunity+and+Other+Issues+Arising+from+the+Supreme+Courts+Venue+
Decision [https://perma.cc/Y5TY-GDHA] (last updated June 29, 2017) (“The logic of the earlier
Brunette case is now in some doubt.”).
113 Re & Oldham, supra note 95.
110
111
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A. Brunette Untouched
One way for the Court to theoretically resolve this issue is to simply leave
Brunette untouched—in other words, to reaﬃrm it. As explained above, TC
Heartland noted that “Congress has not amended § 1400(b) since th[e] Court
construed it in Fourco, but it has amended § 1391 twice,” and the Court
ultimately concluded that “the amendments to § 1391 did not modify the
meaning of § 1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco.”114 If taken literally, the Court’s
disposition indicates that neither the 1988 amendments nor the 2011
amendments to the general venue provisions had any eﬀect on the patent
venue statute at all. From this perspective, the fact that Congress
aﬃrmatively gave a subset of alien defendants a venue defense outside of patent
law is irrelevant. Since Congress will have been deemed to have not
manifested an intent to bring foreign defendants within the scope of the
patent venue statute, Brunette arguably remains intact.
Indeed, the petitioners in TC Heartland briefly made this argument, stating
that although “some alien defendants may have a venue defense under current
§ 1391(c) that did not exist at the time Brunette was decided, . . . neither before
nor after 2011 does any subsection of § 1391 supplement § 1400(b).”115 The
petitioners concluded their argument by explaining that, “as th[e] Court held
in Brunette, alien defendants are simply outside the scope of § 1400(b).”116
Unfortunately, there are two problems with leaving Brunette untouched.
First, Brunette was never limited to merely holding that “alien defendants are
simply outside the scope of § 1400(b),” as the petitioners argued.117 Indeed,
this significantly understates the opinion’s language. Rather, Brunette held that
“suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue
laws, general and special.”118 Since the current version of the general federal
venue law, § 1391, affirmatively gives at least some aliens a venue defense, it
directly contradicts the literal holding of Brunette.119 Moreover, the Court, in
its own words, reaffirmed “the longstanding rule that suits against alien
defendants are outside [all venue] statutes”120 primarily because “Congress
ha[d] never given the slightest indication that it [was] dissatisfied with th[is]

TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017).
Reply Brief at 5-6, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514
(2017) (No. 16-341).
116 Id. at 6.
117 Id.
118 Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972) (emphasis added).
119 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) (2012) (defining residence for a permanent resident, natural-person
alien as his or her place of domicile); H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 23 (2011) (“The proposed statute would
grant a venue defense to permanent resident aliens who are domiciled in the United States.”).
120 Brunette, 406 U.S. at 713.
114
115
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longstanding judicial view.”121 Certainly the current version of § 1391(c)(1),
which literally brings some alien defendants within the scope of the venue
statutes, is more than “the slightest indication” of Congress’s dissatisfaction.
Second, the practical result of leaving Brunette untouched, especially in
view of TC Heartland, is that natural-person aliens sued for patent
infringement will be denied a venue defense, which directly contravenes
Congress’s intent. Recall that TC Heartland held that the deﬁnition of
corporate residence under § 1400(b) must be the same today as it was
understood at the time of Fourco because “the [1988 and 2011] amendments to
§ 1391 did not modify the meaning of § 1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco.”122
To maintain consistency, then, the deﬁnition of a natural person’s residence
under § 1400(b) must necessarily be the same today as it was understood at
the time of Fourco. Now, at the time of Fourco, natural persons were deemed
to reside in a judicial district only if they were domiciled there and were a
citizen of the United States.123 But, according to Brunette, “an alien defendant
is by deﬁnition a citizen of no district.”124 Indeed, since at least 1952, alienage
has always been deﬁned in terms of citizenship, not domicile or residence.125
So, if Brunette stands, a natural-person alien domiciled in the United States
could be sued today for patent infringement in any judicial district,
notwithstanding the venue defense granted in § 1391.
Therefore, permanent resident aliens in patent cases would be denied
venue protection if the current implications of Brunette and TC Heartland are
allowed to materialize. However, this would utterly contravene the apparent
purpose of the 2011 Venue Clariﬁcation Act.126 Since Congress articulated no
principled reason or desire to give venue defenses to permanent resident

Id. at 710-11 (emphasis added).
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017).
See infra Section III.C; see also McInerney & Morgan, supra note 111, at 22 (“Previously,
permanent resident aliens domiciled in the U.S. were treated the same as nonresident aliens for
purposes of being barred from raising a venue defense.”).
124 Brunette, 406 U.S. at 709.
125 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(3), (22) (1952) (deﬁning “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national
of the United States,” and “national of the United States” as “a person who, though not a citizen of
the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(3), (22)
(1970) (same); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(3), (22) (2012) (same); 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3810 (4th ed. 2013) (“Under the law as it existed before
the [2011 Venue Clariﬁcation Act], venue in a suit against an alien—whether a resident or
nonresident of the United States—could be brought in any district.”); McInerney & Morgan, supra
note 111, at 22 (“Previously, permanent resident aliens domiciled in the United States were treated
the same as nonresident aliens for purposes of being barred from raising a venue defense.”).
126 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 23 (2011) (“The proposed statute would grant a venue defense to
permanent resident aliens who are domiciled in the United States.” (emphasis added)); id. at 20
(“[P]roposed subsection 1391(c) would apply to all venuestatutes [sic], including venue provisions that
appear elsewhere in the United States Code [which includes § 1400(b)].” (emphasis added)).
121
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aliens in all cases except patent suits, reaﬃrming Brunette would amount to a
blatant slap in the face to Congress.
Admittedly, however, since the TC Heartland Court seemed unconcerned
with ignoring Congress’s intent that § 1391(c)(2), which defines corporate
residence generally, apply to all venue statutes throughout the entire United
States Code, perhaps it will be similarly unconcerned with ignoring Congress’s
intent regarding § 1391(c)(1), which defines natural-person residence generally.
B. Brunette Overruled
A second way for the Court to theoretically resolve the problem discussed
in Section II.C is to completely overrule Brunette. After all, Brunette primarily
relied on the fact that “Congress ha[d] never given the slightest indication
that it [was] dissatisﬁed with th[e] longstanding judicial view” that aliens are
beyond the protection of the venue laws.127 However, the very text of current
§ 1391(c)(1) provides that “a natural person, including an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to
reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled.”128 Moreover,
the congressional purpose behind this unambiguous text was to “change
venue law by shifting the focus from ‘alienage’ of a defendant to whether the
defendant has his or her ‘residence’ outside the United States,” thereby
“permit[ting] permanent resident aliens domiciled in the United States to
raise a venue defense.”129 In other words, Congress has given much more than
“the slightest indication” that it is dissatisﬁed with the view that all aliens are
outside the venue laws. So, Brunette’s reasoning is no longer accurate, which
arguably calls for it to be overruled. In such case, foreign defendants sued for
patent infringement would be subject only to § 1400(b).130
The main problem with this resolution, however, is that it risks creating
venue gaps: “cases in which the federal courts have jurisdiction but there is no
district in which venue is proper.”131 Normally, venue gaps in general are
eliminated by § 1391(b)(3), which provides that, “if there is no district in which
an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial
district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction
[suffices].”132 Additionally, § 1391(c)(3), providing that “a defendant not

Brunette, 406 U.S. at 710-11.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) (2012).
H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 22-23.
See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518-20 (2017)
(recounting with approval the holdings of Stonite and Fourco that § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive
provision governing venue in patent suits).
131 Brunette, 406 U.S. at 710 n.8.
132 § 1391(b)(3).
127
128
129
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resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district,” eliminates
venue gaps specifically with respect to nonresident defendants.133 These
sections, however, are apparently not applicable to patent suits since no part of
§ 1391 may supplement § 1400(b), as amply explained in Stonite, Fourco, and TC
Heartland. Furthermore, the general principle underlying § 1391(c)(3)—that
aliens/nonresidents are beyond the venue laws—no longer applies to patent
suits since this analysis assumes that Brunette is overruled. Thus, foreign
corporate defendants, which are by definition not incorporated in the United
States, that are sued for patent infringement would be subject only to § 1400(b)
and would be immune from suit if they had no regular and established place of
business, or if that place of business was not located in the district where
infringement occurred.134 Indeed, respondents and several amici in TC
Heartland made this exact argument.135
Since Brunette itself recognized the desirability of construing statutes to
avoid such venue gaps, completely overruling Brunette seems unwise.136
Moreover, while it is possible for the Court to overrule Brunette and
§ 1391(c)(3).
See § 1400(b) (providing proper venue in patent suits where the defendant resides, or where
the defendant has a regular and established place of business and has committed acts of
infringement); TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517 (holding that “a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only
in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute”).
135 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 94, at 24 (“[Under Heartland’s position,] suits against
many foreign defendants would be literally impossible.”); id. at 13 (“Heartland’s view would therefore
overturn Brunette and leave no district where a foreign defendant ‘resides.’”); id. at 26 (“Heartland’s
statutory interpretation produces a muddle in cases with foreign defendants. If Section 1391(c)’s
deﬁnition of residence does not apply, then there would be no proper venue in some cases under
Section 1400(b). If ‘residence’ in Section 1400(b) were limited to the defendant’s place of
incorporation, then a foreign corporation could not be sued anywhere in the United States, unless it
had a ‘regular and established place of business’ in some district and committed infringement
there.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Eighteen Individuals & Organizations Representing Inventors &
Patent Owners in Support of Respondent, supra note 95, at 3-4 (“[A] foreign defendant not
incorporated in the United States, and with no regular and established place of business in the
United States, would not be the subject of proper venue for a suit for patent infringement in any
court in the United States—hardly a result Congress would have intended—to immunize foreign
infringers . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Brief of Amicus Curiae Genentech, Inc. in Support of
Respondent at 15 n.7, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137. S. Ct. 1514 (2017)
(No. 16-341) (“[This statutory interpretation] risks creating a venue framework under which there
would be no proper venue in which to sue certain foreign corporations.”); Brief of Amici Curiae
Guy Fielder et al. in Support of Respondent at 9, In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (No. 16-105) (“Petitioner’s argument leads to a nonsensical consequence – it would prevent all
actions against foreign infringers in U.S. Courts.”).
136 See Brunette, 406 U.S. at 710 n.8 (“Congress does not in general intend to create venue gaps,
which take away with one hand what Congress has given by way of jurisdictional grant with the
other. Thus, in construing venue statutes it is reasonable to prefer the construction that avoids
leaving such a gap.”); see also Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra note 112 (discussing the “natural
reluctance [of the Court] to ﬁnd that . . . Congress accidentally immunized alien corporations with
no U.S. place of business from suit in patent cases”).
133
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simultaneously eliminate venue gaps by deﬁning “residence” diﬀerently for
foreign corporations than for domestic corporations,137 what such a deﬁnition
might look like is beyond the scope of this Comment.
C. Brunette Tweaked
Finally, a third approach for the Court to theoretically resolve the
problem discussed in Section II.C is to appropriately tweak the holding and
reasoning of Brunette. Speciﬁcally, the Court could recognize that Congress
has manifested an intent to shift the focus of all venue laws from
alienage/citizenship to domicile/residence, as evidenced by the 2011 Venue
Clariﬁcation Act and accompanying House Report, already amply explained
above.138 In other words, the Court would simply change the holding of
Brunette from stating that all aliens are outside the protection of the venue
laws to stating that all nonresidents are outside the protection of the venue
laws. This seemingly minor change would arguably be justiﬁed since “[t]he
current provision of § 1391(c)(3) reﬂects the same [venue-gap-eliminating]
substance [as] the alien venue provision that Brunette addressed.”139 After all,
the only substantive diﬀerence between the two provisions is the replacement
of the word “alien” with the phrase “defendant not resident in the United
States.”140 However, this approach would seem to violate TC Heartland, as
well as Stonite and Fourco, because a change in the meaning of § 1400(b) is
being assumed merely from a change in § 1391.141
Herein lies the dilemma. As explained above, it would amount to a slap
in the face to Congress for the Court to hold that natural-person aliens
domiciled in the United States could not raise venue defenses in patent
suits.142 After all, Congress clearly abrogated the longstanding rule that all
aliens are beyond venue protection in favor of the rule that only nonresidents
are beyond such protection.143 However, to alter the meaning of § 1400(b)
based on these amendments to § 1391 would seem to blatantly contravene TC

137 Such a redeﬁnition is possible since the Court was noticeably careful to limit its TC
Heartland decision to “domestic” corporations only. 137 S. Ct. at 1520 n.2.
138 See supra subsection II.C.2.
139 Fish & Richardson, supra note 89.
140 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012) (“[A] defendant not resident in the United States may be
sued in any judicial district . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1970) (“An alien may
be sued in any district.” (emphasis added)).
141 See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1517 (“[T]he amendments to § 1391 did not modify the
meaning of § 1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco.”).
142 See supra Section III.A.
143 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) (2012).
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Heartland.144 Thus, a compelling justiﬁcation would be needed to explain why
the amended deﬁnition of natural-person residence in § 1391(c) applies to
§ 1400(b) while the deﬁnition of corporate residence in § 1391(c) does not.
The diﬃculty with ﬁnding such a justiﬁcation is exacerbated by the fact
that the available evidence of congressional intent regarding these deﬁnitions
is the same. In all these cases—natural-person residence, corporate residence,
and nonresidence—only § 1391 was amended, and the Court in TC Heartland
made clear that “the amendments to § 1391 did not modify the meaning of
§ 1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco.”145
Despite this diﬃculty, a potential justiﬁcation is available. First, the
Court could rule that TC Heartland dealt only with the deﬁnition of corporate
residence, not with the deﬁnition of natural-person residence or with
nonresidence generally.146 Thus, the seemingly broad proclamation that “the
amendments to § 1391 did not modify the meaning of § 1400(b)” can be
conﬁned only to the amendments to § 1391(c)(2), which deﬁnes corporate
residence, rather than to the entirety of § 1391. Having recognized that TC
Heartland considered only Congress’s intent as manifested in the amendment
to § 1391(c)(2), the Court would be free to separately consider Congress’s
intent as manifested in the amendments to § 1391(c)(1) and (c)(3).
Admittedly, restricting TC Heartland in this way does seem somewhat
questionable since TC Heartland’s textual analysis focused primarily on the
phrases “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” and “[f]or all venue purposes,”
which apply generally to all three subsections of § 1391(c).147 Thus, TC
Heartland’s holding on its face arguably applies to all the amendments to
§ 1391(c)—the provision defining natural-person residence, the provision
defining corporate residence, and the provision stating that nonresidents lack
venue protection. But, as explained above, such an interpretation would deny
venue protections to natural-person aliens, which seems like an entirely
ridiculous result given Congress’s exceedingly clear manifestation of intent to
shift the focus of venue law from citizenship to domicile.148 Moreover, the
practice of slightly narrowing precedent cases to achieve reasonable results in
current cases is not new in the law.149 Lastly, although nothing can be concretely
144 See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1518-20 (recounting with approval the holdings of Stonite
and Fourco that the patent venue statute is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in
patent suits, not to be supplemented in any way by the general venue statute).
145 Id. at 1517.
146 See id. (“We therefore hold that a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of
incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.” (emphasis added)).
147 See id. at 1520-21.
148 See supra Section III.A (explaining that denying venue defenses to natural-person aliens in
patent suits would essentially amount to slapping Congress in the face).
149 See e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383-84 (2010) (discussing the requirements
of the famous Miranda warnings from constitutional criminal procedure, and noting that, although
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inferred regarding the fate of Brunette after TC Heartland, it is worth noting how
careful the Court was to avoid reaffirming Brunette.150 This care arguably leaves
room for the holding of TC Heartland to stand while that of Brunette is changed.
Now free to separately consider the impact of the amendments to
§ 1391(c)(1) and (c)(3), the Court could ultimately conclude that Congress’s
amendments to these provisions signaled a much stronger intention to change
the meaning of § 1400(b) than did the amendment to § 1391(c)(2). To do so,
the Court could analyze the historical relationship between the general and
patent venue statutes as explained below.
Recall that, since 1948—excluding the nearly thirty years during which VE
Holding controlled—the general and patent venue statutes had different
definitions of corporate residence.151 As explained above, Congress both recodified
§ 1400(b) and enacted § 1391 in 1948.152 At the time, a corporation under § 1391(c)
resided in its state of incorporation, or where it was licensed to do business or was
doing business.153 Under § 1400(b), on the other hand, it was understood that a
corporation resided only in its state of incorporation.154 Thus, § 1391 and § 1400(b)
had different, inconsistent definitions of corporate residence at their inceptions.
Forty years later, Congress amended § 1391(c) to provide that a corporation resides
wherever it is subject to personal jurisdiction.155 Although VE Holding held that
this definition then applied to § 1400(b), TC Heartland overruled the Federal
Circuit and held that, for patent purposes, a corporation still resides only where it
is incorporated, notwithstanding the different definition of corporate residence in
§ 1391.156 Therefore, it has been historically normal to have different definitions of
corporate residence under the general and patent venue statutes.
“[s]ome language in Miranda could be read to indicate that waivers are diﬃcult to establish” and
that “a heavy burden rests on the government” to demonstrate waiver of one’s Miranda rights, the
Court’s “subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule,” have “stated that this ‘heavy
burden’ is not more than the burden to establish waiver by a preponderance of the evidence,” and
have “therefore ‘retreated’ from the ‘language and tenor of the Miranda opinion’” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (ﬁrst quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); then quoting Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); and then quoting Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523,
531 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
150 See TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1520 n.2 (“We do not here address [foreign corporate venue],
nor do we express any opinion on this Court’s holding in Brunette . . . (determining proper venue
for foreign corporation under then existing statutory regime).” (emphasis added)).
151 See supra Part I.
152 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 1391(c), 1400(b), 62 Stat. 935, 935-36.
153 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952).
154 See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957) (holding that, in
relation to a corporation, the word “resides” “mean[s] the state of incorporation only”).
155 Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (codiﬁed as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012)).
156 See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520-21 (2017) (“As
applied to domestic corporations, ‘residence’ in § 1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals . . . .”).
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The same cannot be said for the deﬁnitions of natural-person residence
or for the treatment of aliens in general. After all, the original venue statute
in 1789 deﬁned venue for all defendants in terms of inhabitance,157 the 1948
venue amendments shifted the focus of both the general and patent venue
statutes from inhabitance to residence,158 and both Congress and the Court
recognized that inhabitance and residence are “synonymous words [that]
mean domicile.”159 Thus, since the general and patent venue statutes both used
the word inhabitance prior to 1948 and residence after 1948,160 they have both
always treated venue as proper where a natural-person defendant is
domiciled. However, they also have always required that the natural-person
defendant be a U.S. citizen.161 Therefore, while it has been historically normal
for the general and patent venue statutes to have diﬀerent deﬁnitions of
corporate residence, it has been historically normal for them to have the same
deﬁnition of natural-person residence—that is, domicile and citizenship.
So, the amendments to § 1391(c)(1) and (c)(3) arguably manifested a much
clearer and stronger congressional intent to modify the meaning of § 1400(b)
than did the amendment to § 1391(c)(2). In other words, Congress’s act of
changing the deﬁnition of corporate residence under the general venue
statute did not really signal an intent to work the same change in the patent
venue statute because those two statutes had always had diﬀerent definitions of
corporate residence anyway. On the other hand, Congress’s act of changing the
deﬁnition of natural person residence—by dropping the citizenship
requirement—and generally shifting the focus of venue law from alienage to
domicile under the general venue statute arguably signaled an intent to work
the same changes in the patent venue statute because those statutes, although
separate, had always had the same definition of natural-person residence. Indeed,
since the rule prohibiting aliens from invoking venue protections applied
universally throughout all the federal venue provisions,162 Congress’s clear

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §§ 1391(c), 1400(b), 62 Stat. 935, 935-36.
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957).
See supra Part I (discussing the history of the general and patent venue statutes and
identifying their wordings both before and after 1948).
161 See In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662 (1893) (ﬁnding that venue protections were
“inapplicable to an alien or a foreign corporation”); see also Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum
Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 709, 714 (1972) (reaﬃrming the “long-established rule that suits against
aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special,” because
“an alien defendant is by deﬁnition a citizen of no district”); 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 125,
§ 3810 (“Under the law as it existed before the [2011 Venue Clariﬁcation Act], venue in a suit against
an alien—whether resident or nonresident of the United States—could be brought in any district.”).
162 See Brunette, 406 U.S. at 714 (reaﬃrming “the long-established rule that suits against aliens
are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special”).
157
158
159
160
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abrogation of that rule arguably applies universally—that is, to both the
general and special venue statutes—as well.163
Although definitely not immune from criticism, this justification is based
on factual observations and would arguably satisfy TC Heartland’s concern with
a clear congressional intent being conveyed by the text of the amended
statute—after all, the statutory text and its historical evolution, by themselves,
support this Comment’s proffered justification, even if the compelling
legislative history is ignored.164 Even though one attempting to show that no
definitional change occurred could argue that natural-person residence had
always meant domicile, the Venue Clarification Act explicitly eliminated the
citizenship requirement for venue protection. Again, prior to the 2011 Act, to
reside as a natural person meant to be a citizen domiciled in the United
States;165 now, to reside as a natural person simply means to be lawfully
domiciled in the United States.166 Thus, the citizenship requirement has been
dropped and so the definition of natural-person residence has, in fact, changed.
Ultimately, this suggested resolution would yield a (somewhat) cohesive
framework for determining proper patent venue. Domestic corporations would
reside in their state of incorporation; foreign corporations would be nonresidents
and would therefore lack venue defenses; natural persons, whether aliens or
citizens, domiciled abroad would lack venue protection; and natural persons,
whether aliens or citizens, domiciled in the United States would be within the
venue laws. These are sensible, practical results obtained while simultaneously
respecting both the 2011 Venue Clarification Act and TC Heartland.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined some problems and inconsistencies
currently plaguing the law of patent venue. It began with a brief examination
of the history of the general and patent-speciﬁc venue statutes in Part I. It
then continued in Part II with an in-depth investigation of the facts, holdings,
and reasonings of TC Heartland and Brunette, the Court’s two most relevant
decisions regarding patent venue. Part II further identiﬁed the apparent
tensions between these two cases and the weakness of Brunette in light of the
2011 Venue Clariﬁcation Act. Finally, in Part III, this Comment explored
163 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 22 (2011) (“[The 2011 Act] would change venue law by shifting the
focus from ‘alienage’ of a defendant to whether the defendant has his or her ‘residence’ outside the United
States.” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 20 (“[S]ubsection 1391(c) would apply to all venuestatutes [sic],
including venue provisions that appear elsewhere in the United States Code.” (emphasis added)).
164 See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017)
(“When Congress intends to [implicitly amend one statute by directly amending another], it
ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the text of the amended provision.”).
165 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
166 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (3) (2012).
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three potential resolutions by which the Court could address these issues,
including reaﬃrming, overruling, and tweaking Brunette.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the best solution available to the
Court is to adjust the holding of Brunette, which currently states that all aliens
lack venue protections, to state that all nonresidents lack venue protections.
Although this seemingly contradicts the clear holding of TC Heartland—by
supplementing the meaning of § 1400(b) with § 1391—a factually based
justiﬁcation for such an analytical move was presented. Since it has been
historically normal for § 1391 and § 1400(b) to have diﬀerent deﬁnitions of
corporate residence, Congress’s act of amending the deﬁnition of corporate
residence in § 1391 did not signal an intent to work the same change in
§ 1400(b). Because, on the other hand, it has been historically normal to have
the same deﬁnition of natural-person residence in § 1391 and § 1400(b),
Congress’s act of amending the deﬁnition of natural-person residence and
shifting the focus of venue law from alienage to domicile in the general venue
statute arguably signaled a much stronger congressional intent to work the
same change in the patent-speciﬁc venue provision.

